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Asymmetries in the Firm’s Use of Debt  
to Changing Market Values 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Using a sample of U.S. firms over the period, 1984 to 2013, this study examines the relation 
between market and book leverage ratios. Unlike Welch (2004) who contends that changes in 
market leverage do not induce adjustments in book leverage, we find an asymmetric effect. That 
is, firms adjust their book leverage only when the changes in market leverage are due to increases 
in equity values. No adjustment is observed when firm equity values decrease. Our results are 
consistent with Myers (1977) and Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006) who argue that optimal debt 
levels decrease with corporate growth opportunities.   
 
 
 
Keywords: market leverage; book leverage; capital structure; adjustment speed 
JEL classification: G32; C23 
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Asymmetries in the Firm’s Use of Debt  
to Changing Market Values 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate finance scholars as well as practitioners employ two measures to assess the 
extent to which firms make use of leverage.1 Many researchers use market leverage ratios (e.g., 
Hovakimian et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Welch, 2004; Leary and Roberts, 2005) while 
others elect to estimate book leverage ratios (e.g., Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Cai and Zhang, 2011; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited, 2011; DeAngelo and Roll, 2015). Although these measures do 
track each other closely, stock returns through their effect on the value of equity, introduces 
divergence between these values over the life of a firm. Welch (2004) reports, however, that firms 
do little to respond to the effect of these stock price changes on their market measured capital 
structures. That is, managers do not take measurable efforts to align market and book leverage 
ratios, resulting in corporate debt-equity ratios varying closely with fluctuations in a firm’s stock 
price.  
This study provides a deeper examination of this relation between market and book 
leverage ratios. More specifically, we investigate under what conditions changes in market 
leverage are accompanied by changes in book leverage. We investigate if there might exist 
circumstances that trigger managers to balance market and book leverage ratios. We also model 
and estimate the speed of capital structure adjustments when they occur. 
We use quarterly data for U.S. firms from 1984 to 2013 to undertake our analysis. We find, 
unlike Welch (2004), that there is a corporate response to equity market driven changes in capital 
                                                 
1 Market leverage is defined as the value of debt divided by the market value of the firm’s assets; book leverage is 
measured as total debt divided by the book value of assets. 
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structure. Contrary to his conclusion that stock returns are the primary component in explaining 
capital structure and capital structure changes, we find that firms do readjust to stock market prices 
rather than simply let their debt ratios fluctuate. Importantly, we determine that this response is 
asymmetric. That is, firms adjust their book leverage only when the change in market leverage is 
due to an increase in the value of a firm’s equity. Rising equity prices have the effect of lowering 
market leverage relative to its book counterpart. Further, we estimate the speed of adjustment of 
the firm’s book leverage to its corresponding market ratio to be 31% per quarter. This is 
considerably higher than the speed of adjustment to the target leverage (26.5%).2,3 By contrast, 
there is no significant adjustment to book leverage when the market leverage increases due to a 
decline in corporate equity values. This behavior is most consistent with Myers (1977) and 
Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006) who contend that debt decreases when the firm enjoys more 
growth opportunities.  
Since the observed adjustment in book leverage is asymmetric, it is difficult to reconcile 
such actions with mechanical mean reversion (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Chen and Zhao, 
2007) or other predictable effects that arise when firms do not follow target behavior (Chang and 
Dasgupta, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012). This asymmetry in adjustment implies a systematic 
behavior that cannot be explained by random changes in book leverage ratios.  
We also consider firm financing choices as suggested by Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and 
Faulkender et al (2012) to better understand the process by which book leverage ratios are adjusted. 
We sort our sample based on the relative position of market to book leverage and then analyze the 
                                                 
2 Target leverage is often referred to as the ‘optimal debt ratio’ and denotes the target ratio a firm is trying to reach. 
3 The estimated speed of adjustment between actual and target leverage ratios for the typical firm in our sample is 
about 26.5% per quarter for market leverage and 26.6% for book leverage. The similarity between book and market 
leverage partial adjustment speed is well documented in the literature (see Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Flannery and 
Hankins, 2013). This quarterly speed of adjustment is lower than the annual speed of adjustment (36.6–40.5%) 
reported by Flannery and Rangan (2006). This might be due to the use of quarterly data that are more volatile, resulting 
in more frequent adjustments.  
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firm’s subsequent financing choices. We find that firms are more likely to issue equity over the 
subsequent period if their market leverage is lower than their book leverage. 
We further examine the changes in leverage ratio components to identify an active 
mechanism through which firms manage their book leverage. We show that the observed reduction 
in book leverage for firms whose market leverage is smaller than the book leverage is mostly 
driven by the increase in the book value of their assets. This increase in their book value comes 
from an active management of working capital, equity, and other liabilities.  
Our study makes an important contribution to our understanding of capital structure choices 
and their dynamics over time. We determine that Welch’s (2004) conclusion that firms do little to 
counteract the influence of stock price changes on their capital structure is only partially supported 
by the data. We find from a thirty-year analysis of corporate debt usage, that book leverage ratios 
follow an asymmetric adjustment process when responding to share price movement. We discover 
that increases in a firm’s equity value flow through to its market leverage ratio and then ultimately 
into its book leverage. Decreases in firm equity values, however, trigger no significant adjustment 
in book leverage ratios. These results provide support for the view that when stock market 
fluctuations are high, book leverage is a more conservative measure of corporate debt utilization. 
We also establish that a firm’s market and book leverage ratios demonstrate very similar evolution 
patterns and track each other quite closely.  
We organize our study into the following sections. In section 2 we describe how firms 
manage their book leverage when it diverges from their market-based leverage. In section 3 we 
discuss our data and sample construction process. In section 4 we briefly describe the co-evolution 
of book and market leverage. Section 5 contains our most important analysis and examines how 
market and book leverage ratios differ in response to changes in the firm’s equity values. We 
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present a comparative analysis of financial and accounting characteristics between high and low 
adjustment firms in Section 6. Section 7 describes our matching analysis that allows us to 
determine the actual channels used to manage book leverage. Section 8 presents a set of robustness 
checks where we examine the possibility of mechanical adjustments to changes in the value of 
market leverage and test alternative definitions of market leverage. Section 9 contains a brief 
summary of our results and a discussion of how these findings contribute to a fuller understanding 
of the dynamics of corporate capital structures.  
 
2. Corporate Management of Book Leverage 
The adjustment in book leverage due to a deviation between market and book leverage in the 
preceding period can be understood with reference to Myers (1977). In that study, Myers separates 
the value of the firm into: (1) the value of assets in place and (2) the present value of future growth 
opportunities. He clarifies that the present value of future growth opportunities is actually the 
“present value of the firms’ options to make future investments.” 
We now apply Myer’s (1977) model of firm value to our analysis of corporate leverage 
management. Consider the book value of assets as reported on the corporate balance sheet as a 
proxy for assets in place. Then consider the market value of assets as a proxy for the value of assets 
in place and the present value of the firms’ options to make future investments. As the range of 
possible future firm values increase, the option value increases. The corresponding market 
leverage ratio consequently decreases when it is calculated as debt divided by the market value of 
assets. This variation in future firm values reduces the amount of debt supported by these growth 
options. Firms thus decrease their book leverage in the following period to lower the 
underinvestment problem produced by the debt overhang.  
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Our empirical results presented later in this study indicate that firms decreasing their book 
leverage tend to be small and have volatile cash flows. When assets in place are larger than assets 
in place and the firm’s growth options, then we do not see an adjustment. Such firms are relatively 
large with stable cash flows, making the underinvestment problem less of a concern. This is 
consistent with the stylized fact that larger firms borrow relatively more (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Fama and French, 2002).  
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
We construct our sample using Compustat North America and the St. Louis Federal 
Research Economic Data (FRED) over the period 1984Q1 to 2013Q4. The resulting dataset 
contains 419,713 firm-quarter observations. Consistent with much of the literature, we require 
each firm to have a fully consolidated accounting statement and be incorporated in the U.S. To 
avoid distortions due to regulation, financial firms (SICs 6000–6999) and regulated utilities (SICs 
4900–4999) are excluded from the sample.  
We analyze fiscal quarters because quarterly financial statements are an important 
communication mechanism between managers and the capital markets. The quarterly statements 
are reviewed, and corporate officers must attest to the quality of these statements since the adoption 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These quarterly statements are widely studied by investors in the 
capital markets to assess a firm’s prospects for growth or value appreciation. Further, CEOs tend 
to emphasize quarterly results since their bonus payments are often linked to them (Matsunaga and 
Park, 2001). Therefore, we focus on the firm’s quarterly results to observe the timing of a leverage 
adjustment.  
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We follow Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Leary and Roberts (2014), and 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) for the identification and construction of our major regressors. Book 
Leveraget is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided 
by the book value of total assets (ATq), all at time t. Market Leveraget is total debt (short-term 
debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market value of total assets. The market 
value of total assets is the stock price (PRCCq) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHPRq) 
plus total debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and the 
investment tax credit (TXDITCq). Firm Size is calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) deflated by 
the GDP deflator, where the deflated index is base lined to 100 for the year 2009. The GDP deflator 
is collected from the St. Louis FRED. 
We calculate several performance and value variables. Profitability is calculated as 
operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book value of total assets (ATq). 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of historical operating income before depreciation 
(OIBDPq), scaled by total assets over the past 12 quarters. The Market-to-Book ratio is calculated 
as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable (PSTKRQ), or (PSTKQ) if 
missing, minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCQ), and then scaled by the book 
value of total assets (ATq). Tangibility is net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book value of total 
assets (ATq).  
Industry Median Book Leverage is the median book leverage estimated for the 2-digit SIC 
code each quarter. We require at least 5 companies in that industry and quarter. Lastly, the variable 
Recession indicates a recession in the economy as defined by NBER's Business Cycle Dating 
Committee.  
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Panel A of Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistics for our variables. We observe 
that the representative firm from our sample has an average book leverage ratio of 22.3%, which 
is almost identical to the market leverage ratio of 22%. The medians of these ratios indicate some 
differences, with the corresponding book leverage ratio being 19.1%, while the market leverage 
ratio is 14.3%. The standard deviation and various percentiles indicate comparable distributions 
for both ratios. The average quarterly firm sales are approximately 28.5 million USD, a 
profitability ratio of 1.4%, with 29.3% of the book value of its assets backed by tangible property, 
plant and equipment. A Market-to-Book ratio for the representative firm is 1.776. These descriptive 
statistics are comparable to those reported in prior studies such as Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). 
Panel B contains the time-series distribution of our sample. We have the greatest coverage, 
with 18,892 observations in 1997. The narrowest coverage occurs in 2013 with 8,977 observations. 
On average, there are 13,990 observations annually.  
4. The Co-Evolution of Market and Book Leverage 
To begin our analysis of the relation and adjustment pattern between book and market 
leverage ratios we present Figure 1. This figure plots the mean book and market leverage ratios 
over our sample period, 1984 to 2013. An immediate observation is that the leverage ratios move 
together and closely track each other. Market leverage, however, is slightly more volatile than its 
book counterpart. Our analysis clearly supports the findings of Bowman (1980) and Bessler, 
Drobetz and Kazemieh (2011) that there is a strong correlation between the market and book 
measures of financial leverage.  
In Figure 2 we plot the median difference between the market and book leverage ratios. 
We find that, on average, market leverage is greater than book leverage around recessions due to 
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the effect of depressed equity values. Book leverage, however, is on average, greater than market 
leverage during the non-recessionary periods. At the same time, the median of the difference 
between market and book leverage ratios tends to fluctuate around zero.4 Figure 2 also shows that 
the difference between market and book leverage moves in waves and peaks during recessions. 
5. The Connection Between Book and Market Leverage 
5.1 A Partial Adjustment Methodology 
In this section we examine the extent to which market and book leverage ratios are linked. 
That is, we investigate whether a firm adjusts its book leverage following changes in its market 
leverage. The obvious link between these ratios is the market value of the firm’s equity. If the 
value of the firm’s equity changes, then the market leverage ratio should adjust immediately. Book 
leverage adjustment is likely to occur later with the issuance of new securities.  
To determine whether there is any relation between changes in market leverage and 
subsequent book leverage, we reformulate the partial adjustment model which is developed in the 
Appendix. We accomplish this by modelling the difference between market and book leverage as 
specified below:  
 𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 = 𝜆(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 −  𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, (1)  
where 𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵  is the difference between book leverage at time t and t-1 for a firm i, 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 −
 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵  represents the difference between market and book leverage ratios at time t-1 for firm i, and 
𝜆 is the speed of the adjustment coefficient. Vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 contains firm-specific control variables. 
The full model also accounts for the potential differences in the speed of adjustment in recession 
periods, different fiscal quarters, and for cyclical companies.  
                                                 
4 Note that zero leverage firms are excluded from the sample. 
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𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 = 𝜆(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 −  𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) + 𝜆𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷
+ 𝜆𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 −  𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) ∗ 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐷
+ 𝜆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 −  𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
Further, we investigate whether firms exhibit different adjustment behavior depending on 
the difference between market and book leverage. We calculate the difference between market and 
book leverage for each of our sample firms. A negative difference, when the market leverage ratio 
is lower than the corresponding book-based ratio, suggests that the market value of the firm is 
higher than its book value. A positive difference, when the market leverage is higher than its 
corresponding book leverage, implies the opposite. Our resulting model is as follows: 
 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 = 𝜆𝑢𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) × 𝐷(𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑣 > 𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣)𝑡−1 + 
                      + 𝜆𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1
𝐵 ) × 𝐷(𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑣 < 𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣)𝑡−1 + 
+ 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
In equation (3), 𝐷(𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑣 > 𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣)𝑡−1 is equal to 1 if the firm’s market leverage is greater 
than its book leverage and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐷(𝑀𝐿𝑒𝑣 < 𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣)t−1 is equal to 1 when the 
firm’s market leverage is lower than its book leverage and 0 otherwise. These relationships are 
measured at time t-1. The vector of firm-specific control variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) includes firm size, 
profitability, cash flow volatility, market-to-book, and asset tangibility. We also control for 
industry median book leverage. To address potential endogeneity and dependent variable 
persistence problems, we estimate the model by GMM (see e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Flannery and Hankins, 2013). 
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5.2 Empirical Findings 
Table 2 presents our empirical findings of whether changes in a firm’s market leverage 
ratio are accompanied by changes in its book leverage. If this is true, then 𝜆 (equation 1), the 
coefficient of interest, should be statistically significant. Model 1 contains the estimation results 
when all the dummy variables are set to zero. The estimated partial adjustment speed is 12.6% per 
quarter. This means that the discrepancy between the market and book leverage ratios in the current 
period is associated with an adjustment in book leverage during the following period. Model 2 
tests for potential differences in adjustment speed during a recession. During economic downturns, 
we observe that the estimated adjustment speed decreases to about 9% per quarter. Interestingly, 
the leverage adjustment behavior of cyclical companies differs significantly from the rest of the 
sample (Model 3). The book and market leverage for these firms move in different directions since 
the estimated adjustment speed is ‒29%.  
One possible explanation for this observed pattern is that cyclical firms enjoy higher 
revenues during periods of economic prosperity, but suffer reduced sales levels during economic 
downturns or contraction. The equity value of these firms is likely to drop significantly during a 
recession, resulting in a mechanical increase in their market leverage. To reduce the costs of 
financial distress, cyclical firms might focus on repaying their debt to reduce their book leverage.  
Models 4 through 6 focus on quarterly, cyclical, and economic downturn effects. Model 4 
accounts for this quarterly variation in the speed of adjustment. The difference between the market 
and book leverage in the fourth quarter has a slightly reduced effect on book leverage during the 
upcoming (first) quarter. Model 5 controls for economic recession and cyclical firms, while Model 
6 is the fully specified model and includes controls for recession, cyclical firms, and individual 
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quarter effects. The results for this comprehensive specification are similar to those of the more 
limited models.  
The capital structure strategies of a firm can differ depending on the market perception of 
a firm’s value and risk. For example, an increase in the value of the firm’s equity can lead to a 
decrease in market leverage. It then becomes interesting to examine whether there is a 
corresponding change in the firm’s book leverage. We examine this issue under two different 
conditions: (1) when the market leverage ratio of a firm exceeds its book leverage ratio (denoted 
as UP) and (2) when the market leverage ratio is less than its book leverage ratio (denoted as 
DOWN).  
Table 3 summarizes our results from this analysis, incorporating relative differences in the 
leverage ratios. Model 1 demonstrates that the speed of adjustment is dependent on the relative 
position of the market to the book leverage ratio. When the market leverage is greater than the 
book leverage (UP) very little adjustment is observed. While the coefficient is statistically 
significant, this result becomes statistically weaker in subsequent specifications and disappears 
when all relevant factors are included (see Model 6).  
When the market leverage is lower than the book leverage (DOWN), the estimated partial 
adjustment speed varies between 31.3% and 32.1% per quarter. The coefficients are uniformly 
positive and highly significant. Their magnitude is about ten times larger than those observed for 
the opposite case (i.e., UP). 
In aggregate, Models 1 through 6 show that the adjustment in leverage is asymmetric. 
When the market leverage is greater than the book leverage (UP), the estimated coefficient is, 
about a tenth the size of the coefficients for those observations when the market leverage is less 
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than its book counterpart (i.e., DOWN). We conclude that firms adjust their book leverage ratios 
only when their market leverage is lower than its book counterpart. 
This pattern might be explained with a discussion of how changing equity prices influence 
both market and book leverage ratios. Decreasing equity values mechanically increase the market 
leverage ratio. But decreasing share prices are generally accompanied by negative earnings, which 
reduce retained earnings and consequently book equity. Book leverage will correspondingly 
increase. Increasing equity values are driven more by expectations of future positive earnings that 
are not yet reflected in the book value of equity. Therefore, adjustments in book leverage occur in 
subsequent periods through the firm’s financing activity. 
We further test these results by examining a subsample of firms that are over-leveraged 
compared to their industry median leverage.5 We expect over-leveraged firms to have lower debt 
capacity and be more eager to adjust their book leverage in response to a change in their market 
leverage. 
Table 4 presents our results. Overall, they are similar to those reported for the full sample 
in the preceeding table. That is, firms adjust their book leverage ratios only when their market 
leverage is lower than its book counterpart. We do observe, however, that this asymmetric 
adjustment in leverage is more pronounced for these over-leveraged firms. The estimated partial 
adjustment speed is 39.7% per quarter in the full model compared to 32.1% for the entire sample 
reported in Table 3. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The results for under-leveraged companies are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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6. Characteristics of Asymmetrically Responding Firms  
In this section we examine more critically the characteristics of those firms that elect to 
asymmetrically adjust their capital structure in response to equity price changes. We focus on the 
characteristics of those firms which exhibit the highest and lowest degree of asymmetric leverage 
adjustment behavior. We measure this asymmetric response as the residuals from the partial 
adjustment model of book leverage estimated in model 6 of Table 3. Those firms with the most 
positive residuals are the ones which exhibit the highest degree of asymmetric leverage 
adjustments. Firms with the most negative residuals respond the least to changes in market equity 
values. We examine the upper and lower quartile of residuals as well as the top and bottom decile. 
Results from this analysis are contained in Table 5.6  
We observe a number of interesting differences between those firms that make large and 
small capital structure adjustments in response to changing equity prices. We find that firms 
making the largest adjustments are significantly smaller based on GDP deflated sales and total 
assets. They also report lower profitability, perhaps due to their higher selling expenses. These 
firms, however, have significantly higher levels of cash and hold more tangible assets in the form 
of property, plant and equipment as well as inventory. These firms also have higher cash flow 
volatility and market-to-book ratios. This suggests that these firms are unwilling to finance their 
growth with debt when their market leverage drops below their book leverage. This finding is 
consistent with the predictions of Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006). We conclude that the 
asymmetric leverage adjustments of firms are not random and firms making such adjustments 
exhibit distinctive characteristics.  
 
                                                 
6 Results from other percentile-based subsamples show comparable results.  
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7. Active Management of Leverage 
In this section we seek to identify the active mechanism by which corporate managers make 
changes in their book leverage. We aim to distinguish whether the change in book leverage is due 
to asymmetric adjustments or to firm characteristics such as size or industry membership. Our 
results suggest the active management of book leverage, especially when it diverges from its 
corresponding market value. In particular, we observe firms whose market leverage is lower than 
their book leverage elect to reduce their book leverage over the following period. Consequently, 
we examine how the specific components of book leverage change in the next period. 
We perform a matching analysis using p-score and nearest neighbor matching. To begin 
our analysis, we split our sample into quartiles based on the difference between market and book 
leverage. The firms in the top quartile, whose book leverage is substantially higher than their 
market leverage, form the treated sample and firms in the bottom quartile, whose market leverage 
is substantially higher than book leverage, are the control sample. Then, we use a matching 
algorithm to find similar pairs of firms in top and bottom quartiles to estimate the so-called 
treatment effect. We combine the exact matching on two-digit industry codes and time (fiscal year 
and quarter) with a propensity score matching on firm-specific characteristics used in our leverage 
regression model. These characteristics are firm size, profitability, cash flow volatility, market to 
book ratio, and industry median book leverage.  
The match is performed at time t. We employ the Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) 
matching procedure which derives the rate of convergence of the nearest neighbor matching 
estimator and the bias-corrected estimator. We use the same caliper of 0.05 which determines the 
weighted distance of the covariates for each observation and we retain only those observations 
which are on common support. Based on the matched firms, we calculate an average treatment 
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effect on treated (ATET) firms for specific book leverage components at time t+1. This estimated 
ATET measures the difference in mean outcomes between the firms in the 1st quartile (with 
BL>ML) and the firm in the 4th quartile (BL<ML).  
Our study uses quarterly data, we therefore focus on mechanisms that managers can 
influence in the short-term. Since raising debt and issuing equity entails additional costs, we 
analyze how firms manage non-interest-bearing liabilities on the liabilities side and treasury stock 
(share repurchases) on the equity side. The equation below shows the disaggregation of the book 
leverage ratio into its components. 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒      =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (4) 
=
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (5) 
=
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
(𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠+𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡)+(𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦−𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘)
  (6) 
 
The empirical results are presented in Table 6. In Panel A, we calculate the difference in 
book leverage between the treated and control groups at time t+1. Our results indicate that firms 
whose market leverage is below book leverage at time t significantly decrease their book leverage 
in the following period even when compared to the matched firms whose market leverage is greater 
than book leverage at time t.  
In Panel B, we further decompose book leverage (Equation 4) into individual components 
(Equation 5 and 6) and calculate the percentage change. The treatment firms in equation (5), 
increase debt by an average of 3.95% compared to the control group. A decrease in book leverage 
occurs only if the denominator increases more. When examining the components of the 
denominator (Equation 5), we find that the treated firms increase their liabilities by 3.42% and 
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their equity by 4.75%. Thus the denominator increases more than the numerator. Therefore, the 
treated group decreases book leverage more than the control group.  
Next, we examine the components in equation (6) where we separate liabilities into non-
interest-bearing liabilities and debt. Also, we separate treasury stock from the equity account. The 
rationale is that in the short-run it might be easier for firms to manage non-interest-bearing 
liabilities and treasury stock (share repurchases) than issuing or retiring debt and raising equity. 
Our results indicate that the treated firms increase non-interest-bearing liabilities by 4.76%. This 
is consistent with the active management of working capital and other liabilities. Working capital 
adjustments are considered an inexpensive source of financing. When looking at treasury stock, 
we do not find any significant differences in treasury stock management between treated and 
control groups. Though we observe an increase in the remaining equity for treated firms. 
To summarize, when we match firms whose market leverage is lower than their book 
leverage at time t (treated) to similar firms whose market leverage is higher than their book 
leverage (control), we find that the treated group reduces book leverage at time t+1 by increasing 
the book value of assets. This increase in book value is driven by the non-interest-bearing 
component of the liabilities section, which suggests the active management of working capital, 
equity, and other liabilities. Even though managers might have more control over share 
repurchases, we do not observe that the increase in equity is driven by that component, at least in 
the short-run. 
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8. Robustness of the Empirical Findings  
8.1. Mechanical Adjustment 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue that the existing models of target leverage behavior 
cannot distinguish deliberate from random financing. They suggest that researchers should look at 
financing choices to test their theories. We undertake such an analysis in this section. 
We begin by sorting firms into two groups at time t-1: (1) firms whose market leverage is 
greater than its book leverage; (2) firms whose market leverage is lower than its book leverage. 
Then at time t we examine the financing behavior of the firm. We expect that when market leverage 
is less than book leverage, a firm should decrease its book leverage by: (1) decreasing net debt 
issuance, (2) increasing net equity issuance or, (3) a combination of both.7 Since our focus is on 
leverage adjustments, we exclude observations where the market and book leverage ratios are 
equal to each other within a 2.5%, 5%, or 10% band.  
Table 7 presents our empirical findings. Using a 2.5% exclusion band, 83.6% of our sample 
firms decrease net debt issuance, increase net equity issuance, or some combination of both when 
market leverage is lower than its corresponding book value. The difference is statistically 
significant when compared to the opposite group. Among our sample firms, 36.7% simultaneously 
reduce net debt issuance and increase net equity issuance when their market leverage is less than 
their book leverage. Again, the difference is statistically significant. As shown in Table 5, using 
our alternative exclusion bands of 5% and 10% yields comparative results.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Consistent with Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), we define Net Debt Issuance as the change in total debt from 
t−1 to quarter t divided by the t−1 book value of total assets. Net Equity Issuance is similarly defined as the split-
adjusted change in shares outstanding (CSHOqt – CSHOqt−1 ∗ (ajexqt−1/ ajexqt)) times the split-adjusted average stock 
price (PRCCQt +PRCCQt−1 ∗ (ajexqt/ajexqt−1)) divided by the t−1 book value of total assets.  
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8.2. Alternative Definitions for Market Leverage 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of leverage. 
Therefore, we redefine market leverage according to that used by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008) and DeAngelo and Roll (2015). Specifically, we estimate Market Leverage (MarketALT) as 
total debt divided by total debt plus the market value of equity all at time t. Market Equity is 
estimated as the stock price (PRCCQ) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHPRQ). We re-
estimate our major findings using this alternative definition and present our results in Table 8.  
Panel A of Table 8 contains our findings that align with those reported in Table 2. The 
estimated coefficients and levels of statistical significance are comparable to those originally 
reported. The partial adjustment speed approximates 17% per quarter, indicating that book 
leverage convergences towards its market leverage counterpart.  
Panel B corresponds to results we report in Table 3. These findings are consistent across 
the tables. Models 1 through 6 show that the book leverage adjustment is dependent on the 
difference between market and book leverage in the previous period. The asymmetry in the book 
leverage adjustment continues to hold. Very little or no adjustment in book leverage is observed if 
the market leverage exceeds book leverage ratio. The partial adjustment speed in book leverage, 
however, is about 30% if market leverage is lower than book leverage.  
In Panel C, we present the results for the subsample of firms that are over-leveraged 
compared to the industry median book leverage. This analysis parallels that reported in Table 4. 
Again, our original findings are confirmed. That is, firms adjust their book leverage ratios only 
when their market leverage is lower than their book counterpart. This asymmetric adjustment in 
leverage, however, is even more pronounced when firms are over-leveraged.  
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9. Conclusion and Discussion 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms over the period from 1984 to 2013, we find, contrary to 
Welch (2004), that firms do adjust their book leverage ratios in response to changes in market 
leverage that are driven by share price appreciation. Interestingly, these observed adjustments in 
the book leverage are asymmetric. That is, firms adjust their book leverage relative to market 
leverage only when the changes in market leverage are due to increases in firm value. No 
adjustment is observed when firm values decrease.  
We find a number of significant differences between firms making large and small capital 
structure adjustments in response to changing equity prices. We find that firms making the largest 
adjustments are significantly smaller, report lower profitability, and experience higher selling 
expenses. These firms, however, have significantly higher levels of cash and hold more tangible 
assets. These firms also have higher cash flow volatility and market-to-book ratios. We conclude 
that the asymmetric leverage adjustments of firms are not random and firms making such 
adjustments exhibit distinctive characteristics.  
One potential explanation for these results is that book and market leverage ratios are 
connected through the value of a firm (assets in place versus growth opportunities) as discussed 
by Myers (1977) and Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006). The equity value of a firm increases 
with additional growth options even if there is no change in the value of assets in place. This 
increase in equity value leads to a mechanical decrease in market leverage. This results in the 
firm’s market leverage being lower than its book leverage. We find that firms narrow the difference 
between these two ratios over subsequent periods by decreasing the book leverage. They can 
accomplish this by managing their working capital, equity and other liabilities. No adjustment in 
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book leverage is observed, however, when the change in market leverage is due to a decrease in 
equity value.  
The importance of these findings is that they challenge the notion that stock returns are the 
only determinant or the major determinant of leverage dynamics. We show that share price 
movements explain capital structure patterns only when corporate equity values are declining. 
When share prices increase and decrease market leverage ratios, firms actively seek to readjust 
their book leverage. Thus, managers actively manage their capital structures with stock price 
movements explaining only a portion of the corporate leverage dynamic.  
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Appendix: Leverage Partial Adjustment Model 
 
A standard partial adjustment model is defined as follows: 
 ∆𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 stands for the leverage of company i in the period t, ∆𝑑𝑖𝑡 denotes an actual change in 
leverage between period t and period t-1, and 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗  represents firm target leverage. Assuming that 
target leverage is a function of industry- and firm-level characteristics, denoted as 𝑥𝑖𝑡, we obtain 
the following specification: 
 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 . (2) 
We can estimate the model in a one-step approach. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
and substituting equation (2) into (1), we obtain the following (FE) model: 
 
 𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 = −𝜆𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
  
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
∗𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 
where the speed of adjustment is 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜑 and 𝛽∗ = 𝜆𝛽. To allow for the differences in the speed 
of adjustment during a recession period, for cyclical industries, or for different financial reporting 
quarters, we modify the model as below:  
 ∆𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷(𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, (4) 
where 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to one for the specific period or subsample with a 
potentially different speed of adjustment (𝜆 + 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷) , such as a recession or for a cyclical firm. 
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Therefore, a specific model that allows us to estimate the adjustment speed during a recession is 
defined as follows: 
 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝜆𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 − 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 + 𝜆𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑1𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 +   𝛽
∗𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷
∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷  + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (5) 
As before, the partial speed of adjustment is equal to 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜑, while the partial speed of 
adjustment in the recession period or for cyclical firms is 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷 = 1 − 𝜑 − 𝜑𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷, 𝛽
∗ = 𝜆𝛽 
and 𝛽𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷
∗ = 𝜆𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝛽. 
The final model accounts for potential differences in the speed of adjustment in the 
recession period (denoted as 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷), for cyclical firms (𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐷) and in different reporting 
quarters (a set of three quarterly dummies, which for simplicity we denote as 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷). The 
model is specified as follows:  
 
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷 + 𝜑𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐷
+ 𝜑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷 +   𝛽
∗𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷  + 𝛽𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐷
+ 𝛽𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷+𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(6) 
 
Where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 stand for the leverage of company i in the period t and t-1, respectively. 
Similarly to (), we get 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜑, 𝜆𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 − 𝜑 − 𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝜆𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 1 − 𝜑 −
𝜑𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝜆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 1 − 𝜑 − 𝜑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟. Finally, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm-specific control variables 
that are Firm Size, Profitability, Cash Flow Volatility, Market-to-Book, and Tangibility. We also 
control for an Industry Median Book Leverage. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Market and Book Leverage 
This figure shows the evolution of average book and market leverage ratios from 1984 quarter 1 to 2013 quarter 4. 
Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by book assets 
(ATq), all at time t Market Leverage
 
is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the 
market value of assets. Market value of assets is stock price (PRCCq) times shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total 
debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITCq). 
We exclude zero-leverage firms. The shaded area represents recessions as defined by the NBER. 
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Figure 2: Mean and Median Differences between Market and Book Leverage 
This figure plots the difference (mean and median) between market and book leverage from 1984 quarter 1 to 2013 
quarter 4. Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by 
the book value of total assets (ATq), all at time t. Market Leverage
 
is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term 
debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market value of total assets. The market value of total assets is the stock price (PRCCq) 
times the  number of shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) 
minus deferred taxes and the investment tax credit (TXDITCq). We exclude zero-leverage firms. The shaded area 
represents recessions as defined by the NBER. 
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics and Annual Distribution  
This table presents the summary statistics for the entire sample, which spans the first quarter of 1984 through the last 
quarter of 2013.  Panel A shows the descriptive statistics. Panel B shows the number of observations by year. Book 
Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by book assets (ATq), 
all at time t. Market Leverage
 
is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market 
value of assets. Market value of assets is stock price (PRCCq) times shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total debt plus 
preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITCq). Firm Size 
is calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) deflated by the GDP deflator with a base value of 100 for the year 2009. 
Profitability is calculated as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book value of total assets 
(ATq). Cash Flow (CF) Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating income before 
depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by total assets over the past 12 quarters, Market-to-Book is calculated as the market 
value of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable (PSTKRQ), or (PSTKQ) if missing, minus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCQ). Everything is then scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). 
Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq).  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev 5th 10th 90th 95th 
Book Leverage 419,713 0.223 0.191 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.509 0.610 
Market Leverage 419,713 0.220 0.143 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.586 0.712 
Firm Size  419,713 3.349 3.366 2.533 -0.855 0.208 6.535 7.445 
Profitability 419,713 0.014 0.028 0.087 -0.105 -0.048 0.066 0.082 
CF Volatility  419,713 0.027 0.016 0.063 0.004 0.005 0.056 0.084 
Market-to-Book  419,713 1.776 1.159 2.426 0.480 0.585 3.379 4.892 
Tangibility 419,713 0.293 0.225 0.237 0.028 0.046 0.677 0.792 
         
 
 Panel B: Observations by year 
Year N  Year N 
1984 10,839  1999 17,424 
1985 11,141  2000 17,600 
1986 11,344  2001 16,670 
1987 12,516  2002 15,596 
1988 13,231  2003 14,756 
1989 13,264  2004 14,460 
1990 13,069  2005 14,374 
1991 13,089  2006 14,216 
1992 13,596  2007 13,836 
1993 14,499  2008 13,527 
1994 15,892  2009 12,222 
1995 16,471  2010 11,405 
1996 17,653  2011 10,550 
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1997 18,892  2012 9,922 
1998 18,682  2013 8,977 
Total 419,713    
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Table 2: Partial Adjustment of Book Leverage to Market Leverage 
This table presents the GMM regression results for equations (2) estimating the partial adjustment models for changes in book leverage 
with respect to the book-market leverage position. We control for a possible correlation between fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable (Baltagi, 2008). We correct any biases using a GMM system estimation procedure, introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Interactions with recession, cyclical industries, and different quarters provide estimates of the respective speed of adjustment. Book 
Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the book value of total assets (ATq), 
all at time t. Market Leverage is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market value of assets. 
The market value of assets is stock price (PRCCq) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total debt plus preferred stock 
(PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and the investment tax credit (TXDITCq). Firm Size is calculated as the log of 
sales (SALEq) deflated by the GDP deflator, where the deflated index is baselined to 100 for the year 2009. Profitability is calculated 
as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book value of total assets (ATq). Cash Flow (CF) Volatility is 
calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by the value of total assets over 
the past 12 quarters. Market-to-Book is calculated as the market value of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable 
(PSTKRq), or (PSTKq) if missing, minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCq). Everything is then scaled by the book 
value of total assets (ATq). Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). Industry 
Median Book Leverage is the median book leverage at 2 digit SIC industry level in the respective quarter. Estimated coefficients for 
firm controls are not reported but are available upon request. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Diff t-1 (Market-Book) 0.126*** 0.139*** 0.164*** 0.128*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × Recessiont-1  -0.051***   -0.051*** -0.046*** 
 
 (0.010)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × Cyclicalt-1   -0.460***  -0.469*** -0.439*** 
 
  (0.146)  (0.146) (0.150) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q1t-1    -0.007*  -0.007* 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q2t-1    0.001  -0.000 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q4t-1    -0.012***  -0.012*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1    Incl.  Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 
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Table 3: Partial Adjustment of Book Leverage to Market Leverage Given Book-Market Difference  
This table presents the GMM regression results for equation (3) which estimates the partial adjustment models for changes in the book 
value of leverage with respect to the difference in book-market leverage ratios. We control for a possible correlation between fixed 
effects and the lagged dependent variable (Baltagi, 2008) with a GMM system estimation procedure (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
UP(DOWN) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when MrktLev > BookLev (MrktLev < BookLev). Interactions with recession, cyclical 
industries and different quarters provide estimates of the respective speed of adjustment. Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-
term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the book value of total assets (ATq), all at time t. Market Leverage is total 
debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market value of total assets. The market value of total assets 
is stock price (PRCCq) times shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITCq). Firm Size is calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) deflated by the GDP deflator 
where the deflated index is baselined to 100 in 2009. Profitability is calculated as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) 
divided by the book value of total assets (ATq). Cash Flow (CF) Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating 
income before depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by total assets over the past 12 quarters. Market-to-Book is calculated as the market value 
of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable (PSTKRq), or (PSTKq) if missing, minus deferred taxes and the investment 
tax credits (TXDITCQq). All are then scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) 
scaled by the book valure of total assets (ATq). Industry Median Book Leverage is the median book leverage at 2 digit SIC industry 
level in the respective quarter. The estimated coefficients for firm controls are not reported,  but are available upon request. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Difft-1 (Market -Book) × UP -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.030* -0.028** -0.039* -0.033 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) 
Leverage Difft-1 (Market -Book) × DOWN 0.313*** 0.318*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.321*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Leverage Difft-1  × Recessiont-1  0.009   0.008 0.013 
 
 (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage Difft-1 × Cyclicalt-1   0.058  0.064 0.087 
 
  (0.153)  (0.153) (0.157) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q1t-1    -0.013***  -0.014*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q2t-1    -0.006  -0.006 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q4t-1    -0.011***  -0.012*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1       Incl.   Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 374,036 
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Table 4: Partial Adjustment of Book to Market Leverage for Overleveraged Firms 
This table presents the GMM regression results for equation (3) which esitmates the speed of adjustment models for changes in book 
leverage with respect to book-market leverage position. The sample contains firms which are overleveraged in comparison to the median 
industry level. We control for a possible correlation between fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable (Baltagi, 2008) by using a 
GMM system estimation procedure (Blundell and Bond, 1998). UP(DOWN) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when MrktLev > BookLev 
(MrktLev < BookLev). Interactions with recession, cyclical industries and different quarters provide estimates of the respective speed of 
adjustment. Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the book value of 
total assets (ATq), all at time t. Market Leverage is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market 
value of total assets. The market value of total assets is the stock price (PRCCq) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus 
total debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and the investment tax credit (TXDITCq). Firm 
Size is calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) deflated by the GDP deflator where the deflated index is based lined to 100 for 2009. 
Profitability is calculated as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book valure of total assets (ATq). Cash 
Flow (CF) Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by total  
assets over the past 12 quarters. Market-to-Book is calculated as the market value of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock 
redeemable (PSTKRq), or (PSTKq) if missing, minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCq). All are then scaled by the 
book value of total assets (ATq). Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). Industry 
Median Book Leverage is the median book value of leverage at 2 digit SIC industry level in the respective quarter. The estimated 
coefficients for firm controls are not reported, but are available upon request. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Difft-1 (Market -Book) × UP -0.024 -0.052** -0.000 -0.017 -0.035 -0.036 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) 
Leverage Difft-1 (Market -Book) × DOWN 0.350*** 0.363*** 0.367*** 0.367*** 0.377*** 0.397*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Leverage Difft-1  × Recessiont-1  0.044**   0.044** 0.061*** 
 
 (0.019)   (0.019) (0.020) 
Leverage Difft-1 × Cyclicalt-1   -0.214  -0.129 -0.128 
 
  (0.210)  (0.210) (0.209) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q1t-1    -0.020***  -0.021*** 
 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q2t-1    -0.011**  -0.012** 
 
   (0.005)  (0.005) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q4t-1    -0.018***  -0.021*** 
 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1    Incl.  Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 173,329 173,329 173,329 173,329 173,329 173,329 
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Table 5: Comparative Characteristics for Asymmetrically Responding Firms  
This table presents the summary sample statistics for firms who exhibit the highest and lowest degree of asymmetric leverage adjustment behavior. Specifically, we save the residuals 
from Model 6 in Table 3, equation 3 in text, and analyze the biggest positive and negative residuals. The cutoffs are 25% and 10%. Firm Size is calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) 
deflated by the GDP deflator with a base value of 100 for the year 2009. Profitability is calculated as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book value of 
total assets (ATq). Cash is calculated as Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHEq) scaled by book assets (ATq). Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book 
value of total assets (ATq). Cash Flow (CF) Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by total assets over 
the past 12 quarters. Market-to-Book is calculated as the market value of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable (PSTKRQ), or (PSTKQ) if missing, minus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCQ). Everything is then scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). Log (Book Assets) is the log of book assets which are deflated by the 
GDP deflator (from FRED), deflated index 100=2009. Collateral is calculated as inventory (INVTq) plus net PPE (PPENTq)) scaled by book assets. Selling Expense is calculated 
as Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (XSGAq) scaled by sales (SALEq). Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) 
divided by book assets (ATq), all at time t. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Variable Top Quartile  Bottom Quartile  
Difference of 
Means   Top Decile  Bottom Decile  
Difference of 
Means 
Firm Size  2.213 4.294 -2.081***  2.960 4.166 -1.206*** 
Profitability -0.008 0.026 -0.034***  0.001 0.020 -0.019*** 
Cash 0.204 0.080 0.124***  0.126 0.073 0.053*** 
Tangibility 0.212 0.481 -0.269***  0.262 0.531 -0.269*** 
CF Volatility  0.040 0.021 0.019***  0.035 0.023 0.012*** 
Market-to-Book  2.321 1.189 1.132***  1.911 1.165 0.746*** 
 
       
Log (Book Assets) 3.887 5.822 -1.935***  4.304 5.826 -1.522*** 
Collateral 0.374 0.606 -0.232***  0.437 0.644 -0.207*** 
Selling Expense 1.962 0.393 1.569***  2.266 0.551 1.715*** 
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Table 6 
Active Management of Leverage  
This table shows the results for the nearest neighbor matching procedures (Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2011). We assign the difference between market and book leverage at time t-1 
to quartiles. We then compare the firms whose market leverage is substantially lower than their book leverage (quartile 1; treated group) to firms whose market leverage is substantially 
higher than book leverage (quartile 4; control group). The firms from each quartile are matched using the nearest neighbor procedure to find similar pairs. In Panel A, we analyze the 
difference in book leverage between the quartile 1 and quartile 4 firms at time t. This is the average treatment effect of the treated firm. In Panel B, we analyze the percentage change 
in the respective variable between the treated and control groups. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: Difference in Book Leverage 
Variable N Average treatment effect on treated (ATET) Robust Standard Errors t-stat P>|t| 
Difference Book Leveraget (Treated - Control) 191,646 -0.002*** 0.00 -7.30 0.00 
 
Panel B: Components of Book Leverage 
Variable (Percentage Change in Mean Effects) N Average treatment effect on treated (ATET) Robust Standard Errors t-stat P>|t| 
Percentage Change Book Value of Assets t 190,860 3.95% *** 0.08 51.97 0.00 
Percentage Change Debt t 181,944 3.20% *** 0.19 17.22 0.00 
Percentage Change Liabilities t 190,786 3.42%*** 0.11 30.53 0.00 
Percentage Change Book Value of Equity t 190,448 4.75% *** 0.17 28.30 0.00 
Percentage Change Non-Interest-Bearing Liabilities t 190,943 4.76% *** 0.14 33.72 0.00 
Percentage Change Remaining Equity t 180,964 4.97% *** 0.20 24.43 0.00 
Percentage Change Treasury Stock t 65,547 0.13% 0.44 0.29 0.77 
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Table 7: Financing Choices 
The table presents financing choices for two groups of firms at time t.   The first group are those firms whose market leverage is lower than the book leverage at time t-1; The second 
group are those firms whose market leverage is greater than the book leverage at time t-1. We exclude observations where market leverage and book leverage are equal to each other 
within a 2.5%, 5%, and 10% band. Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the book value of total assets (ATq), 
all at time t. Market Leverage
 
is total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) divided by the market value of total assets. The market value of total assets is the 
stock price (PRCCq) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHPRq) plus total debt plus preferred stock (PSTKq or PSTKRq if missing) minus deferred taxes and the investment 
tax credit (TXDITCq). Net Debt Issuance is calculated as the change in total debt from quarter t−1 to quarter t divided by the  t−1 book value of total assets. Net Equity Issuance is 
calculated as the split-adjusted change in the number of shares outstanding (CSHOqt – CSHOqt−1 ∗ (AJEXqt−1/ AJEXqt)) times the split-adjusted average stock price (PRCCqt 
+PRCCqt−1 ∗ (AJEXqt/AJEXqt−1)) dividend by the book value of total assets at t-1.  
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Table 8: Alternative Definition of Market Leverage and Partial Adjustment Analysis  
This table presents the GMM regression results using the market leverage definition from Leary and Michaely (2014). We control for a 
possible correlation between fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable (Baltagi, 2008) by uisng a GMM system estimation 
procedure (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The interactions with recession, cyclical industries, and different quarters provide estimates of 
the respective speed of adjustment. Book Leverage is calculated as total debt (short-term debt (DLCq) + long-term debt (DLTTq)) 
divided by the book value of total assets (ATq), all at time t. Market Leverage(MarketALT) is calculated as total debt divided by total 
debt plus the market value of equity, all at time t. The market value of equity is the stock price (PRCCQ) times the number of shares 
outstanding (CSHPRQ). UP(DOWN) is a dummy variable that equals 1 when MrktLev > BookLev (MrktLev < BookLev). Firm Size is 
calculated as the log of sales (SALEq) deflated by the GDP deflator, where the deflated index 100 is base lined to 100 for the year 2009.  
Profitability is calculated as operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) divided by the book value ot total assets (ATq). Cash Flow 
(CF) Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of historical operating income before depreciation (OIBDPq) scaled by total assets 
over the past 12 quarters. Market-to-Book is calculated as the market  value of equity plus total debt plus preferred stock redeemable 
(PSTKRq), or (PSTKq) if missing, minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITCq). Everything is then scaled by book value 
of total assets (ATq). Tangibility is calculated as net PPE (PPENTq) scaled by the book value of total assets (ATq). Industry Median 
Book Leverage is the median book leverage at 2 digit SIC industry level in quarter t-1. Panel A contains GMM regression results for 
equation (2) and relates to Table 3. Panel B presents the GMM regression results for equation (3) and relates to Table 4. Panel C is 
analogous to Table 5. The sample in Panel C contains firms which are overleveraged relative to the median industry (book) leverage. 
The estimated coefficients for firm controls are not reported, but are available upon request. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Partial Adjustment of Book Leverage to Market Leverage 
 
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Diff t-1 (MarketALT -Book) 0.132*** 0.146*** 0.169*** 0.135*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × Recessiont-1 
 -0.053***   -0.056*** -0.049*** 
 
 (0.011)   (0.011) (0.010) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × Cyclicalt-1 
  -0.430***  -0.456*** -0.424*** 
 
  (0.150)  (0.151) (0.154) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q1t-1 
   -0.008*  -0.008* 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q2t-1 
   0.002  0.000 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Diff t-1 × q4t-1 
   -0.014***  -0.013*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.005) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1    Incl.  Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 
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Panel B: Partial Adjustment of Book Leverage to Market Leverage Given Book-Market Difference   
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Difft-1 (MarketALT -Book) × UP -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.031* -0.025* -0.040* -0.033 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) 
Leverage Difft-1 (MarketALT -Book) × DOWN 0.301*** 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.310*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Leverage Difft-1  × Recessiont-1  0.007   0.005 0.011 
 
 (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage Difft-1 × Cyclicalt-1   0.080  0.087 0.105 
 
  (0.158)  (0.160) (0.163) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q1t-1    -0.014***  -0.015*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q2t-1    -0.005  -0.005 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q4t-1    -0.013***  -0.014*** 
 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1       Incl.   Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 374,745 
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Panel C: Partial Adjustment of Book Leverage to Market Leverage for Overleveraged Firms Given Book-Market 
Difference  
 
  ΔBook Leveraget 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Leverage Difft-1 (MarketALT -Book) × UP -0.012 -0.043* 0.006 -0.003 -0.033 -0.035 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) 
Leverage Difft-1 (MarketALT -Book) × DOWN 0.336*** 0.349*** 0.355*** 0.352*** 0.365*** 0.383*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) 
Leverage Difft-1  × Recessiont-1  0.043**   0.041** 0.059*** 
 
 (0.020)   (0.019) (0.020) 
Leverage Difft-1 × Cyclicalt-1   -0.140  -0.048 -0.031 
 
 
 (0.216)  (0.217) (0.215) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q1t-1    -0.020***  -0.022*** 
 
 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q2t-1    -0.010*  -0.011** 
 
 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Leverage Difft-1 × q4t-1    -0.021***  -0.023*** 
 
 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Firm Controls t-1 Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Recessiont-1  Incl.   Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Cyclicalt-1   Incl.  Incl. Incl. 
       Interacted with Quarterst-1    Incl.  Incl. 
Firm and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 17,3927 17,3927 17,3927 17,3927 17,3927 17,3927 
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Highlights 
• Firms asymmetrically adjust book leverage in response to changes in market leverage 
• Adjustments in book leverage are observed only when firm value increase 
• Book and market leverage ratios are connected through the value of a firm 
• Results are consistent with Myers (1977): Assets in place vs. growth opportunities 
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